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Contributory Negligence: Anderson v. Ceccardi
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ohio legislature in 1980 adopted a system of comparative negligence' under
which the contributory negligence of a plaintiff no longer acts as a complete bar to
recovery of tort damages, provided that the plaintiff's negligence does not exceed the
combined negligence of all of the defendants. 2 Not unlike comparative negligence
statutes adopted by other states, 3 the Ohio act failed to address the impact of com-
parative negligence on doctrines peripheral4 to the common law doctrine of contrib-
utory negligence. One of these peripheral doctrines, assumption of risk, traditionally
acted as a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery if the plaintiff voluntarily incurred a
known or appreciated risk of harm created by the defendant's conduct. Assumption of
risk requires three elements: one must have full knowledge of a condition; the condi-
tion must be dangerous-a risk of harm; and the plaintiff must be voluntarily exposed
to the hazard created.
5
Numerous courts6 and legal scholars7 have addressed the issue whether assump-
1. Osno REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page 1981).
2. Ohio's comparative negligence statute is of the so-called modified form. The plaintiff can recover the percent of
damages caused by the defendants only if the plaintiff's fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is "no greater than the
combined negligence of all other persons from whom recovery is sought." Id. § 2315.19(A)(1). The pure form of
comparative negligence allows a plaintiff to recover damages for injuries to the extent the defendant's negligence caused
those injuries, even though the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the defendant's. Thus, when a plaintiff is responsible for
90% of his injuries, he may seek the remaining 10% from a negligent defendant. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.
3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). A variant of the modified form of comparative negligence allows a
plaintiff to recover an amount diminished in proportion to his or her own negligence, provided that the plaintiff's
negligence is not equal to or greater than the negligence of the defendant. A plaintiff subject to this type of comparative
negligence can be at most 49% negligent without being barred completely. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156
(1980). Some have criticized the 49% form of comparative negligence becausejuries often apportion fault evenly between
parties, and in such a situation, a 50% negligent plaintiff would recover nothing. However, under the same statute, a
plaintiff determined by the trier of fact to be 49% negligent would be able to recover damages for the 51% negligence of
the defendant. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAtw. L. REv. 1, 25 (1953).
3. See Annot., 78 A.L.R.3D 339, 354-62 (1977).
4. Doctrines peripheral to contributory negligence include assumption of risk, last clear chance, and strict liability.
See generally V. ScHwARrz, COMPARATvE NEGiUoErcE §§ 2.3, 7.1-.3, 9.1-.5, 12.1-.7 (1974).
5. Briere v. Lathrop Co., 22 Ohio St. 2d 166, 174-75, 258 N.E.2d 597, 603 (1970); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) oF ToRTs § 496A-E (1965).
6. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Gillapie, 443 P.2d 61 (Alaska 1968); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d
1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Bulatao v. Kauai Motors, Ltd., 49
Haataii 1,406 P.2d 887 (1965); Smith v. Blakey, 213 Kan. 91, 515 P.2d 1062 (1973); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398
(Me. 1976); Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Bolduc v. Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d
641 (1962); McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963); Wentz v. Deseth 221 N.W.2d 101
(N.D. 1974); Zumwalt v. Lindland, 239 Or. 26, 396 P.2d 205 (1964); Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.
1975); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973). In addition, some state legislatures have
dealt with the problem of assumption of risk in a system of comparative negligence. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 52-572h (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. Ctv. PRAc. LAw § 1411 (McKinney 1976).
7. See, e.g., W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971); James, Assumption of Risk:
Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968); Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L.
REv. 122 (1961).
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tion of risk should continue to act as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery in light of
the adoption of comparative negligence. Although some states that have adopted
comparative negligence continue to regard assumption of risk as an affirmative de-
fense that completely bars recovery, 8 the trend today is to treat assumption of risk as
merged with or a form of contributory negligence. 9 The Supreme Court of Ohio in
Anderson v. Ceccardi1 ° held that, under Ohio's comparative negligence act, conduct
by the plaintiff previously considered assumption of risk now will be considered
contributory negligence. 1 Anderson represents Ohio's merger of the doctrines of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence for purposes of Ohio's comparative
negligence act. This Note will examine the merging of two doctrines that Ohio courts
traditionally have considered distinguishable by examining the elements and various
forms of assumption of risk and how the concept of assumption of risk relates to the
doctrine of contributory negligence. An analysis of the Anderson holding reveals
that, in Ohio, with two narrow exceptions (i.e., when the plaintiff expressly assumes
the risk 12 and when the defendant does not breach a duty of care 3), assumption of
risk no longer retains a meaning independent from contributory negligence. 14
Although this result is an abrupt turnabout from prior Ohio law, the adoption of
comparative negligence necessitated such a change.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK:
TYPES OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The assumption of risk doctrine gives legal recognition to the principle that a
person who is willing to incur a potentially dangerous situation cannot later complain
of injuries that arise out of that venturousness. 15 Thus, under the assumption of risk
8. See, e.g., Arkansas Kraft Corp. v. Johnson, 257 Ark. 629, 519 S.W.2d 74 (1975); Riley v. Davison Constr.
Co., 381 Mass. 432, 409 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); Blum v. Brichacek, 191 Neb. 457, 215 N.W.2d 888 (1974); Kennedy v.
Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977).
9. See, Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348
So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973); McConville v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
10. 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 451 N.E.2d 780 (1983).
11. Id. at 113, 451 N.E.2d at 783.
12. Express assumption of risk is present when a plaintiff signs an agreement expressly relieving the defendant of
legal obligation should the plaintiff be harmed by the defendant's negligence. See infra text accompanying notes 23-26.
13. The Supreme Court of Ohio views primary assumption of risk as a situation in which the defendant is found to
have either not owed a duty of care to the plaintiff or not breached a duty of care owed. In either situation, the defendant is
not negligent. See infra text accompanying notes 80-89.
14. Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 113, 451 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1983).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
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doctrine a plaintiff who voluntarily 16 incurs a known 7 risk of harm arising from the
conduct of the defendant will be unable to recover for resulting injuries.' 8
During the 19th century, assumption of risk, like contributory negligence,' 9
emerged as a judicially created response to the needs of expanding industry. 2" Pro-
tecting emerging industries from the prohibitive expense of compensating workers'
employment-related injuries, courts held that workers were free to choose their place
of employment and that workers, therefore, voluntarily assumed the risk of dang-
erous working conditions. 2 ' Unfortunately, the assumption of risk doctrine soon
expanded from master-servant relationships into general areas of tort law. Conse-
quently, the phrase "assumption of risk" became so overused that today it encom-
passes several related, but distinct legal concepts.
22
A. Express Assumption of Risk
Though generally understood in terms of a plaintiff's voluntary incurrence of a
known risk, assumption of risk signifies many situations involving a defendant and a
risk-assuming plaintiff. Express assumption of risk, the most obvious form of risk
assumption, occurs when a plaintiff expressly states that the defendant will be held
blameless for the plaintiff's failure to exercise due care for his or her protection in
16. The doctrine of assumption of risk only bars a plaintiff who voluntarily assumes the risk. "Since the basis of
assumption of risk is the plaintiffs willingness to accept the risk, take his chances, and look out for himself, his choice in
doing so must be a voluntary one." Id. § 496E(l) comment a. "If the defendant's tortious conduct has left him [the
plaintiff] no reasonable alternative course of conduct to (a) avert harm to himself or another, harm or (b) exercise or
protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has no right to deprive him," the plaintiff's acceptance of the risk is not
voluntary. Id. § 496E(2). Thus, if a plaintiff incurs the risk of entering a burning building to save his child from a fire,
caused by the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff does not assume the risk voluntarily. Comment, Assumption of Risk in
a Comparative Negligence System-Doctrinal, Practical, and Policy Issues: Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc.;
Blackburn v. Dorta, 39 Ono ST. L.J. 364, 376 (1978). However, the plaintiffs acceptance of a risk is voluntary even
though no reasonable alternatives are available in the circumstances, if the defendant is not responsible for or negligent in
creating such a situation. "Thus a plaintiff who is forced to rent a house which is in an obvious dangerous condition
because he cannot find another dwelling, or cannot afford another, assumes the risk notwithstanding the compulsion under
which he is acting." REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 496E comment b (1965).
17. Since the basis for assumption of risk is the plaintiff's consent to incur a potentially dangerous situation, absent
an express agreement, courts will not find the plaintiff to have assumed the risk unless he has knowledge or appreciation of
the risk of harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965). The trier of fact will apply a subjective test of what
the plaintiff actually knew or understood about the risk of harm in the situation; however, an adult will be held to have
knowledge of obvious dangers such as burning by fire, drowning in water, or falling from a height. Id. § 496D comments
c-e.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 496A (1965); see also Benjamin v. Deffet Rentals, Inc., 66 Ohio St. 2d 86,
90, 419 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1981).
19. Contributory negligence, a common law doctrine that completely bars a negligent plaintiff from recovery from a
negligent defendant, generally is thought to have originated in the English case of Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep.
926 (1809); see W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 65, at 416 n. 1. Acceptance of contributory negligence as a legal doctrine
grew quickly in the United States during the nineteenth century, a period of rapid industrial expansion. Both contributory
negligence and assumption of risk are generally believed to have been created asjudicially imposed forms of protection of
developing industries from the high costs of workers' injuries. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54,
58-59 (1943).
20. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58-59, (1943).
21. Id. at 61. Today, however, workers' compensation acts put the risk of injury from industrial accidents directly
upon industry. Thus, assumption of risk no longer is applicable to the master-servant relationships for which courts
originally developed it. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 21.4 (1956).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 27-56.
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certain circumstances.2 3 Thus, if a plaintiff signs an exculpatory agreement with the
defendant whereby the plaintiff agrees not to hold the defendant liable for injuries
resulting from a given situation, the plaintiff has relieved the defendant of a duty of
care and, thus, has assumed the risk of any harm that may arise from that situation.
24
Express assumption of risk resembles consent 25 because the plaintiff affirmatively
and clearly waives his or her rights. Therefore, most comparative negligence ju-
risdictions have retained express assumption of risk as a complete bar to plaintiff's
recovery.
26
B. Implied Assumption of Risk
Implied assumption of risk is present when a plaintiff's actions imply a knowing
and voluntary assumption of a risk of harm created by the defendant. The plaintiff
does not "expressly consent to accept the risk; but by voluntarily electing to proceed
with knowledge of the risk in a manner which will expose him to it, he manifests a
willingness to accept" the risk and, therefore, is barred from recovery.
2 7
1. Implied Primary Assumption of Risk
Implied assumption of risk can be categorized into primary and secondary
forms.28 Primary assumption of risk occurs when a defendant is not negligent. It may
arise either when the defendant owes no duty of care to the plaintiff or when the
defendant does not breach the duty that was owed.2 9 Unlike secondary assumption of
risk and contributory negligence, primary assumption of risk is not an affirmative
defense; rather, primary assumption of risk describes a situation in which the de-
fendant breached no duty to plaintiff and therefore was not negligent.3"
A common example of implied primary assumption of risk occurs when a sports
fan attends a baseball or hockey game. Under traditional negligence analysis, though
the management initially owes a duty of care to spectators, that duty is fulfilled by
providing a number of screened-off seats to prevent spectators from being injured. 3
The concept of primary assumption of risk, however, presents another way of reach-
ing the same conclusion. Although foul balls and errant hockey pucks are unavoid-
23. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 496B (1965).
24. Id. Such an agreement need not be for consideration, and can concern general conduct by the defendant or relate
to specific acts. Id. at comment b. Some express agreements may be unenforceable because of public policy or disparity in
bargaining power. Id. at comments e-j.
25. Express assumption of risk is similar to consent, an affirmative defense that completely bars a plaintiff's
recovery for a defendant's intentional tort. Express assumption of risk can be seen as plaintiff's consent to the risk of
defendant's negligent conduct--the plaintiff expressly agrees to hold the defendant harmless for the risk. See V.
ScHtwARTz, supra note 4, § 9.5; see also infra text accompanying notes 23-26, 96-99.
26. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 9.2; see, e.g., Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 401 (Me. 1976); Springrose v.
Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971); see also Comment, supra note 16, at 367, 373-74.
27. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496C comment b (1965).
28. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 48-49, 155 A.2d 90, 93 (1959).
29. Id.
30. "Primary assumption of risk ... relates to the initial issue of whether a defendant was negligent at all-that is,
whether the defendant had any duty to protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm. It is not, therefore, an affirmative
defense." Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971).
31. See, e.g., Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Ass'n, 105 Wash. 215, 181 P. 679 (1919) (per curiam).
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able aspects of the games being played, the average spectator believes that the value
of watching the event outweighs the possibilities of being injured and, therefore,
assumes these risks. In this case, the owner has not necessarily affirmatively fulfilled
the duty of care owed by providing protected seats, but the spectator's conduct in
accepting the known risk extinguishes the owner's duty. Whether the owner fulfills
the duty owed by providing reasonably safe seats, or whether the owner's duty is
extinguished by the spectator's assumption of risk, the injured spectator will not
recover. Both of these situations, however, differ from when the owner owed no duty
at all.32
Some commentators believe that by dropping the primary assumption of risk
label and analyzing this form of conduct in a no-duty context, much of the confusion
and ambiguity that presently exist with respect to assumption of risk as a general
doctrine would be alleviated.33 Prosser rejects these suggestions, however, arguing
that no advantage is gained by a simple change in terminology. 34 Whether phrased in
terms of no duty or primary assumption of risk, this conduct continues to act as a
complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery despite the enactment of a system of com-
parative fault; since the defendant is by definition not negligent, comparative fault
analysis is unnecessary.
2. Implied Secondary Assumption of Risk
Implied secondary assumption of risk occurs when the defendant has breached a
duty of care owed to the plaintiff and the plaintiff has not expressly assumed the
risk.35 While primary assumption of risk occurs when either the defendant is not
negligent or the defendant's duty is extinguished by the plaintiff's conduct, secondary
assumption of risk occurs when the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known risk of
harm created by the defendant's negligence.3 6 Since the negligence of the defendant
has been established, secondary assumption of risk is an affirmative defense. 37
Implied secondary assumption of risk can be broken down further into the
plaintiff's reasonable and unreasonable assumption of risk.38 The effect of com-
parative negligence upon these forms of assumption of risk has caused a split among
courts 39 and legal scholars. 40 Reasonable implied assumption of risk leads to policy
problems even if a jurisdiction has adopted a system of comparative negligence, for
32. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 68; see infra text accompanying notes 81-85.
33. E.g., 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 21, § 21.1.
34. W. PRossER, supra note 7, § 68, at 456.
35. See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 49, 155 A.2d 90, 93 (1959).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See James, supra note 7, at 188-89.
39. Compare MeConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962) and
Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977) (secondary assumption of risk is merged with or treated as a form of
contributory negligence) with D'Andrea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 R.I. 479, 287 A.2d 629 (1972) and Kennedy v.
Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977) (assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not
synonymous and traditionally have been treated as conceptually distinct doctrines).
40. See James, supra note 7, at 185; W. PRossER, supra note 7, § 68, at 454-57; RVSTArmErrr (SEcoND) oF ToRTs
§ 496C (1965).
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even though the plaintiff voluntarily has assumed a known risk and is a partial author
of the injury suffered, the plaintiff has acted in a reasonable manner. The issue is
whether courts should deny recovery to a plaintiff who has acted reasonably solely
because the plaintiff voluntarily incurred a known risk. The inconsistency of a policy
denying recovery is that the plaintiff is, in effect, punished for acting in a manner that
the law encourages. Courts denying recovery in this situation reason that, "[w]hen
one acts knowingly, it is immaterial whether he acts reasonably."'" Other courts42
hold that assumption of risk should not bar a reasonable plaintiff from recovery.
According to those courts, the central issue is the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable
care.
43
Unreasonable secondary assumption of risk occurs when the plaintiff voluntarily
but unreasonably decides to proceed in the face of a known risk created by the
defendant's negligent conduct.44 The classic illustration of the difference between
reasonable and unreasonable secondary assumption of risk is a plaintiff who enters a
blazing building to rescue a child, and then re-enters to recover a favorite hat.45
Unreasonable assumption of risk creates a problem of doctrinal overlap since the
plaintiff's conduct can be characterized as both assumption of risk and contributory
negligence. 46 "[Tihere are situations where the defenses of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence will overlap. The plaintiff's conduct in accepting the risk
may itself be unreasonable, because the danger is out of all proportion to the interest
which he is seeking to advance .... ",4 The doctrinal overlap between unreasonable
secondary assumption of risk and contributory negligence is particularly important in
a comparative negligence jurisdiction. In Anderson, the Ohio Supreme Court stressed
that if assumption of risk remains a complete bar to recovery despite enactment of a
comparative negligence statute, "a defendant can circumvent the comparative negli-
gence statute entirely by asserting the assumption of risk defense alone." 4 8 For
example, if a plaintiff passenger unreasonably assumed the risk of riding with an
intoxicated defendant driver, the defendant could defend by proving that the plaintiff
either was contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk. In a comparative negli-
gence jurisdiction the plaintiffs contributory negligence would not act as a complete
41. Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 77, 376 A.2d 329, 333 (1977).
42. The Ohio Supreme Court in Anderson did not specifically discuss the problems of reasonable and unreasonable
secondary assumption of risk. However, the cases cited by the majority hold that reasonable assumption of risk is not a
valid defense. See Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83
Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973); MeConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14
(1962).
43. "The key concern should be whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable care; if he did, he should be allowed to
recover ...... Rea v. Leadership Hous. 312 So. 2d 818, 823 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), aft'd, 348 So. 2d 287 (1977);
see also Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826
(1971); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83
Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973); McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14
(1962).
44. See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 53, 155 A.2d 90, 95 (1959).
45. Id. However, entering a blazing building to rescue a spouse or a child may differ from rescuing a total stranger.
Since the former conduct may be involuntary, it may not constitute assumption of risk. See supra note 16.
46. See Masters v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 147 Ohio St. 293, 301, 70 N.E.2d 898, 903 (1947).
47. Id. (quoting W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs (Ist ed. 1941)).
48. Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 113, 451 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1983); see also W. PRossFR, supra note
7, § 68 at 456-57.
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bar, but merely would reduce the plaintiffs recovery. If assumption of risk remains a
defense independent from contributory negligence, the defendant avoids apportion-
ment under comparative negligence principles by raising the assumption of risk
defense alone. However, if the doctrines are merged, assumption of risk no longer
completely bars recovery; rather, as a form of contributory negligence, assumption of
risk becomes a factor in the apportionment process.
The debate over unreasonable assumption of risk revolves around the issue
whether the doctrine is necessary in light of its similarity to contributory negligence.
Not unlike the position that primary assumption of risk should be abandoned in favor
of a no duty analysis,49 some commentators argue that secondary unreasonable
assumption of risk has no meaning independent from contributory negligence and,
therefore, should be abrogated to avoid unnecessary confusion. 50 Harper and James
contend that the assumption of risk concept is merely a duplication of other, more
widely understood doctrines such as scope of duty and contributory negligence. 51
Harper and James argue that except for express assumption of risk-cases in which
an actual agreement to assume a risk exists-the term and concept of assumption of
risk should be abolished.52
The opposing view is that although assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence may at times overlap and coincide, they are conceptually different. 53 Courts
that retain assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery despite the adoption of
comparative negligence have noted three primary differences between assumption of
risk and contributory negligence: (1) assumption of risk concerns knowledge of the
danger and voluntary acquiescence in it, but contributory negligence is simply an
unknowing and unsuspecting departure from the standard of reasonable care; (2)
assumption of risk is judged by a subjective standard based upon what the plaintiff
actually knew, but contributory negligence employs an objective, "reasonable per-
son" standard; and (3) assumption of risk is based upon the plaintiff's venturousness,
but contributory negligence is based upon reasonableness. 54 Ohio had accepted these
rationales prior to the Anderson decision. 55
These opposing positions differ only with respect to the weight of culpability a
jurisdiction gives to the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk. In jurisdictions that view
secondary unreasonable assumption of risk as merely a form of contributory negli-
gence, the plaintiff's knowledge is a factor mitigating against recovery but is not a per
49. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
50. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 21, § 21.8; James, supra note 7, at 187-88; Note, Contributory
Negligence and Assumption of Risk-The Case for Their Merger, 56 Minn. L. Rev. 47 (1971).
51. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMms, supra note 21, § 21.1.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Arkansas Kraft Corp. v. Johnson, 257 Ark. 629, 519 S.W.2d 74 (1975); Riley v. Davidson Constr.
Co., 381 Mass. 432, 409 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); Blum v. Brichacek, 191 Neb. 457, 215 N.W.2d 888 (1974); Kennedy v.
Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977).
54. See Riley v. Davidson Constr. Co., 381 Mass. 432, 409 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); Blum v. Brichacek, 191 Neb.
457, 215 N.W.2d 888 (1974); Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 57-69.
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se bar to recovery.5 6 Other jurisdictions view the difference between a plaintiff's
contributory negligence and knowledge of the risk as one of substance rather than
degree and retain unreasonable assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery.
57
Both reasonable and unreasonable secondary assumption of risk are affected by
a state's adoption of comparative negligence. Express and primary assumption of risk
arise in situations in which the defendant's breach of duty is not established so
comparative negligence does not apply. An analysis of why the Supreme Court of
Ohio in Anderson decided to merge secondary assumption of risk with contributory
negligence first requires an examination of Ohio's prior decisions that distinguish
between assumption of risk and contributory negligence. Furthermore, the Anderson
decision must be examined to determine if the abrogation of assumption of risk as a
complete bar to recovery is warranted and if so, to measure the effect of this decision
upon Ohio's comparative negligence system.
III. OHIO LAW PRIOR TO ANDERSON V. CECCARDI
Prior to Anderson, Ohio law held that assumption of risk and contributory
negligence were not synonymous, although the two defenses sometimes applied to
the same conduct.58 The Ohio courts held that contributory negligence was based
upon carelessness, but assumption of risk was based upon the venturousness of the
plaintiff.59 The courts distinguished the doctrines because "assumption of risk is a
matter of [the plaintiffs] knowledge of the danger and intelligent acquiescence in
it ... ,,60 "[wihile contributory negligence is a matter of some fault or departure
from the standard of reasonable conduct," regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge.
6 1
Furthermore, Ohio courts held that although assumption of risk and contributory
negligence overlap in some situations, the doctrines are neither exclusive nor in-
clusive. 62 Since assumption of risk requires that the plaintiff have knowledge of a
dangerous situation before voluntarily encountering it, a subjective inquiry is
necessary. 63 Contributory negligence is determined by an objective inquiry into what
56. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348
So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973); McConville v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
57. See, e.g., Riley v. Davison Constr. Co., 381 Mass. 432, 409 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); Kennedy v. Providence
Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977).
58. See, e.g., DeAniches v. Popczun, 35 Ohio St. 2d 180, 299 N.E.2d 265 (1973); Wever v. Hicks, 11 Ohio St. 2d
230, 228 N.E.2d 315 (1967); Porter v. Toledo Terminal R.R. Co., 152 Ohio St. 463, 90 N.E.2d 142 (1950); Masters v.
New York Cent. R.R. Co., 147 Ohio St. 293, 70 N.E.2d 898 (1947).
59. Porter v. Toledo Terminal R.R. Co., 152 Ohio St. 463, 446, 90 N.E.2d 142, 143 (1950).
60. Masters v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 147 Ohio St. 293, 301, 70 N.E.2d 898, 903 (1947) (quoting W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK Or THE LAW OF TORTS 378-79 (Ist ed. 1941)).
61. Id.; see generally W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 68.
62. Thus, Ohio accepted the position that in some cases assumption of risk might exist when contributory negligence
was not applicable (reasonable assumption of risk). DeAmiches v. Popczun, 35 Ohio St. 2d 180, 186, 299 N.E.2d 265,
268 (1973). After Anderson, reasonable assumption of risk is unlikely to have any significance in negligence actions;
undoubtedly, it will not act as a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery, nor should reasonable assumption of risk act to
reduce the recovery of a plaintiff. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text. But see VanEman, Ohio's Assumption
of Risk: The Deafening Silence, 11 CAP. U.L. REv. 661, 680 (1982) ("[o]ne who reasonably assumes a risk will
nevertheless be barred from recovery if such contributing conduct exceeds the negligence of all defendants combined.").
63. DeAmiches v. Popzcun, 35 Ohio St.2d 180, 186, 299 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1973).
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a plaintiff should have known and whether the plaintiff departed from the standard of
a reasonable person under similar circumstances. 64 These distinctions represent the
conceptual differences between the doctrines, and prior to Anderson, were sufficient
to prevent the Supreme Court of Ohio from merging assumption of risk and contrib-
utory negligence.
65
Before comparative negligence was adopted, the distinctions between assump-
tion of risk and contributory negligence were irrelevant because both acted to bar
completely the plaintiff's recovery. 66 Comparative negligence developed as a means
of reducing the harshness of the "all or nothing" doctrine of contributory negligence.
Rather than acting as a total bar to recovery, comparative negligence allows con-
tributorily negligent plaintiffs to recover damages that are diminished in proportion to
the plaintiffs' culpability. 67 A comparative negligence statute that does not address
assumption of risk leads to the problem of distinguishing assumption of risk and
contributory negligence, two very similar doctrines of law that require vastly differ-
ent results. As noted in Anderson, retaining assumption of risk as a total bar would
enable the defendant to avoid completely the apportionment of damages under the
comparative negligence act by asserting the assumption of risk defense alone. 68 In
this situation, the difference between a complete denial of a recovery because of
unreasonable implied assumption of risk and a diminished recovery because of con-
tributory negligence statute rests upon the subjective inquiry whether the plaintiff had
knowledge of the risk. Courts in the past have examined assumption of risk and
contributory negligence for distinguishing elements significant enough to justify the
dichotomy of a partial recovery in the latter situation but no recovery in the former.
6 9
Though prior to adopting comparative negligence, Ohio had adhered to the notion
that assumption of risk and contributory negligence represented different doctrines,
the Anderson opinion shows that the distinctions separating the doctrines are not
sufficient to withstand the strains created by adopting comparative negligence and the
resulting rejection of the all or nothing approach to recovery.
IV. ANALYSIS OF ANDERSON V. CEccARDI
The plaintiff in Anderson leased a home from the defendant landlord. The home
had three entrances, but the entrance to the front door was unsafe because of faulty
steps.7° Anderson continued to use the front entrance despite his knowledge of the
faulty steps and his opportunity to use one of the other two safe entrances. 71 As a
result of the landlord's negligence in failing to repair these steps, Anderson fell and
was injured. 72
64. Id.
65. See Wever v. Hicks, 11 Ohio St. 2d 230, 233; 228 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1967).
66. See W. PRossm, supra note 7, § 68 at 441.
67. See V. SctWART-z, supra note 4, § 2.1.
68. Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 113, 451 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1983).
69. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Deffet Rentals, Inc., 66 Ohio St. 2d 86, 419 N.E.2d 883 (1981); DeAmiches v. Popczun,
35 Ohio St. 2d 180, 299 N.E.2d 265 (1973); Wever v. Hicks, It Ohio St. 2d 230, 228 N.E.2d 315 (1967).
70. Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 110, 451 N.E.2d 780, 781 (1983).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Anderson's attempt to recover damages was denied by the trial court, which
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon Anderson's volun-
tary assumption of the risk of using the unsafe steps.7 3 The court of appeals reversed,
ruling that although assumption of risk and contributory negligence did not merge
under Ohio's comparative negligence act, Anderson was not barred by his landlord's
assumption of risk defense. The court held that the determinative issue was a factual
question whether the defendant had caused the plaintiff's injury.74 The Supreme
Court of Ohio held "that the defense of assumption of risk is merged with contrib-
utory negligence under R.C. 2315. 19,- 71 Ohio's comparative negligence statute.
[C]onduct previously considered as assumption of risk by the plaintiff shall be considered
by the trier of the fact under the phrase "contributory negligence of the person bringing
the action" under R.C. 2315.19, and the negligence of all parties shall be apportioned by
the court or jury pursuant to that statute. 76
A. Express Assumption of Risk
In merging the two doctrines, the Anderson decision followed other states that
have merged assumption of risk and contributory negligence and specifically ex-
cluded express assumption of risk from that merger.7 7 Express assumption of risk
remains a complete bar to recovery in jurisdictions on both sides of the issue of the
role of assumption of risk in a comparative negligence system.78 In addition, com-
mentators who argue that assumption of risk is a confusing duplication of other more
easily understood doctrines and should be abandoned acknowledge that express
agreements represent an area in which assumption of risk retains an independent
vitality. 7
9
B. Implied Assumption of Risk: Primary Sense
Like express assumption of risk, primary implied assumption of risk was ex-
cluded from the merger with contributory negligence under the Anderson decision
and, therefore, remains a complete bar to recovery. 80 Although the court in Anderson
referred to primary assumption of risk as a situation in which "there is a lack of duty
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, '" 81 the court did not adopt the position that
73. Id. at 111, 451 N.E.2d at 781.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 113, 451 N.E.2d at 783.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 114, 451 N.E.2d at 783. Other cases that have excluded express assumption of risk from the merger with
contributory negligence include: Blackbum v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Smith v. Blakey, 213 Kan. 91, 515
P.2d 1062 (1973); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me. 1976); Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826
(1971); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83
Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973).
78. See, e.g., Riley v. Davison Constr. Co., 381 Mass. 432,409 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); Springrose v. Willmore, 292
Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); see also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 9.2.
79. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 21, § 21.6; Note, supra note 50.
80. Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 114, 451 N.E.2d 780, 783-84 (1983).
81. Id.
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primary assumption of risk should be abrogated in favor of the no duty analysis. s2
However, since the court referred to primary assumption of risk as a situation in
which the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff, the court failed to distinguish its
position of retaining the doctrine from that of adopting a strict no duty analysis. If
primary assumption of risk is simply a situation in which the defendant owes no duty,
then a no duty analysis is sufficient, and primary assumption of risk should be
discarded. Prosser argues that assumption of risk should not be discarded in favor of
no duty analysis. In his view, a plaintiff's primary assumption of risk may extinguish
the defendant's duty of care but this is not the same as the defendant not having owed
any duty at all. "What, in such a case, changes 'duty' to 'no duty'; and if it is not to
be called assumption of risk, what better name can be found?"
8 3
The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to abrogate primary assumption of risk,
apparently accepting Prosser's view that primary assumption of risk differs from the
no duty analysis. 84 In some cases, the defendant's duty to protect the plaintiff is
extinguished not because the defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff but because
the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk." Burden of proof considerations make
important the distinction between situations in which the defendant owes no duty at
all and those in which the plaintiff's assumption of risk extinguishes the defendant's
duty. 86 In all cases, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant both owed a duty to the
plaintiff and breached that duty. The defendant must prove assumption of risk since it
is an affirmative defense. A shift to a strict no duty analysis would remove the
defendant's burden of proving plaintiff's assumption of risk. Instead, the plaintiff
would bear the added burden of disproving assumption of risk as part of the prima
facie case.8 7 Proponents of abrogating the use of primary assumption of risk argue
that in practice courts are unlikely to shift the burden of proof from the defendant to
the plaintiff.8 8 As Professor James noted:
While the assumption of risk formulation is theoretically more likely to induce courts to
put the burden of proof on defendant than is the no-duty formulation of the same problem,
this is not likely to be the result in practice. Courts rarely lose sight of the duty issue
where burden of proof is concerned . ... 89
The Anderson court did not expressly reject the Harper and James view that a
strict no-duty analysis should replace primary assumption of risk. However, the
82. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMs, supra note 21, § 21.1. Because primary assumption of risk was not at issue in the
Anderson case, the court simply may have decided that this issue was not yet ripe for decision. However, the court
expressly mentioned that primary assumption of risk remains unaffected by the merger of secondary assumption of risk
and contributory negligence. This indicates that the court considered the issue.
83. See W. PRossER, supra note 7, § 68 at 455-56.
84. Id.
85. See Shaw, The Role of Assumption of Risk in Systems of Comparative Negligence, 46 INs. CouNs. J. 360, 383
(1979). A plaintiff's recovery is denied not because the owner of a baseball park owes no duty to spectators to protect them
from foul balls, but because either (i) the owner fulfills his duty by providing a reasonable number of protected seats, or
(ii) the spectator who sits in an unscreened seat voluntarily incurs a known, obvious risk, and therefore extinguishes the
owner's duty. See W. PRosSER, supra note 7, § 68 at 455-56.
86. See W. PRossER, supra note 7, § 68 at 454-57.
87. Id.
88. See James, supra note 7, at 196.
89. Id.
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court's position that primary assumption of risk was unaffected by the merger of
secondary assumption of risk and contributory negligence indicates this result. Thus,
although the Anderson decision merged assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence for purposes of comparative negligence, the Anderson court stopped short of
adopting the full Harper and James position that primary assumption of risk be
abrogated as well.
C. Secondary Assumption of Risk
The adoption of comparative negligence requires an examination of the policies
underlying secondary assumption of risk and contributory negligence to determine
whether these policies warrant different results from the application of the two doc-
trines. Some courts hold that secondary assumption of risk, whether reasonable or
unreasonable, remains a complete bar to recovery despite the enactment of com-
parative negligence. 90 Other courts hold that secondary assumption of risk no longer
completely bars recovery but merges with contributory negligence, and conduct
previously considered assumption of risk now is subject to negligence standards. 91
The latter view is the general trend92 and is the view Ohio adopted in Anderson.
1. Secondary Assumption of Risk
Remaining a Complete Bar to Recovery
Some courts have retained assumption of risk as a complete defense despite the
enactment of a comparative negligence statute.93 These courts recognize that the
basis for denying recovery under assumption of risk differs from that under contrib-
utory negligence. The former bases denial of recovery upon the plaintiffs knowledge
and voluntary choice in incurring a risk of harm; the latter bases denial of recovery on
the failure of plaintiffs conduct to conform to a standard of reasonable care. Those in
favor of retaining assumption of risk as a complete bar view knowledge and voluntary
incurrence of risk sufficiently important to justify denying recovery, even if the
plaintiff has acted reasonably. 94
[T]he plaintiffs knowledge and voluntary decision to proceed is the basis for denying
recovery, rather than the plaintiff's negligence.... One who undertakes a risk, knowing
and appreciating the danger involved, may also in so doing fail to exercise due care for his
own safety. It must be emphasized, however, that one may voluntarily assume the risk of
harm and yet not be negligent in doing soY5
These are valid distinctions between the doctrines. Certainly, these distinctions
show that assumption of risk concerns knowledge and choice, subjective factors, in
an area of law dominated by objectivity. The most tenable argument favoring reten-
90. See, e.g., Riley v. Davison Constr. Co., 381 Mass. 432,409 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); Blum v. Brichacek, 191 Neb.
457, 215 N.W.2d 888 (1974); Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977).
91. See, e.g., Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
93. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Riley v. Davison Constr. Co., 381 Mass. 432, 409 N.E.2d 1279, 1282-83 (1980); Kennedy v.
Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 77, 376 A.2d 329, 333 (1977).
95. Riley v. Davidson Constr. Co., 381 Mass. 432, 437, 409 N.E.2d 1279, 1283 (1980).
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tion of secondary assumption of risk as a total bar to recovery bases the denial of
recovery not upon the plaintiff's fault but upon the plaintiff's conscious agreement,
similar to consent, to proceed in the face of a risk of harm. 9 6 However, consent
differs from secondary assumption of risk in that consent to an intentional tort
97
manifests an agreement by the plaintiff to incur an actual injury. Assumption of risk
is merely an agreement by the plaintiff to be subject to a possible injury that the
plaintiff hopes will not actually occur.98 "This is a giant step away from consent
when viewed from the perspective of whether plaintiff has actually agreed to hold
defendant harmless for the risk."- 99
Under express assumption of risk, the plaintiff actually has agreed to hold the
defendant blameless, and, as a result, it seems fair to deny recovery to the plaintiff.
However, a plaintiff whose conduct constitutes secondary implied assumption of risk
is not in the same position:
It must surely be a rare case in which a party encountering a danger subjectively intends
that the creators of the danger should bear no responsibility for any injury he might suffer.
Quite to the contrary, in the usual case the state of mind of the encountering party will be
hope that the danger does not materialize into actual harm, and expectation of some
recourse if harm does occur. Such a person's attitude is not one of consent, but of
acquiescence. 100
Although the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk may not rise to the level of consent to
the harm, in fairness, knowledge should impose a greater degree of responsibility
upon the plaintiff, certainly more than if the plaintiff is merely negligent. The error of
retaining assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery is not that these factors are
unimportant but that they are not of enough importance to justify a total bar to
recovery. Though knowledge of the risk coupled with contributory negligence should
reduce plaintiff's recovery to a greater extent than contributory negligence alone,
knowledge does not warrant a complete abandonment of the apportionment principles
of comparative negligence. The policy of apportionment of comparative fault should
continue to determine the extent of recovery with the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk
weighing against recovery.
a. Reasonable Assumption of Risk
Reasonable assumption of risk has been an issue of dispute among both courts"0'
and commentators. 10 2 The controversy surrounding this doctrine arises from the
96, See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 9.5.
97. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
98. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 9.5, at 174. The court in McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15
Wis. 2d 374, 378, 113 N.W.2d 14, 16 (1962), observed that while assumption of risk is similar to consent, assumption of
risk represents "consent only to being exposed to danger which one hopes will not materialize in harm."
99. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 9.5, at 174 (emphasis in original).
100. See Shaw, supra note 85, at 405; see also McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 379,
113 N.W.2d 14, 17 (1962) in which the court refers to assumption of risk conduct as acquiescence.
101. See, e.g., Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W. 2d 826 (1971); Braswell v. Economy Supply Co.,
281 So.2d 669 (Miss. 1973); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959); McConville v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
102. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496C comment g (1965); W. PROssER, supra note 7 § 68;
Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REv. 14 (1906); James, supra note 7; Keeton, supra note 7.
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anomalous results its application can produce; the doctrine prevents recovery by a
plaintiff who has acted reasonably. 10 3 This denial of recovery, despite reasonable
conduct on the part of the plaintiff, moved some courts to abrogate reasonable
assumption of risk as a complete bar even before the adoption of comparative
negligence.1 04
Adoption of comparative negligence, a doctrine that indicates a reluctance to
make judgments according to all or nothing standards, further magnifies the problems
of reasonable assumption of risk. A comparative negligence jurisdiction that retains
reasonable assumption of risk as a complete bar would allow an unreasonable plain-
tiff to be awarded a partial recovery yet would deny recovery to a reasonable plaintiff
who had assumed the risk.' 0 5 By denying recovery to plaintiffs who reasonably
assume risks, the retention of assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery defeats
the policy of deterring negligence- encouraging people to act reasonably-that
underlies the law of torts. Thus, reasonable assumption of risk should not reduce
plaintiff's recovery in any way.
b. Unreasonable Assumption of Risk
Before the adoption of comparative negligence, both assumption of risk and
contributory negligence acted as a complete bar to recovery. Therefore, it did not
matter which defense the defendant chose to use against a plaintiff who had unreason-
ably assumed a risk. 106 However, comparative negligence transforms plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence from a complete bar to a partial bar to recovery and fairly
equates liability to fault. '0 7 Knowledge of a risk, the distinctive aspect of assumption
of risk in most states, does not create the level of culpability necessary to deny
completely a recovery to a plaintiff. 108 Unreasonable assumption of risk, conduct that
constitutes both contributory negligence and knowledge of a risk, raises the question
whether two forms of conduct that independently do not bar recovery should act as a
bar in combination. A plaintiff who unreasonably assumes the risk is more culpable
than either a plaintiff who reasonably assumes the risk or who is simply contributorily
negligent.
However, rather than allow the combination of knowledge and unreasonableness
to create a per se bar to recovery when none independently exists, the policies
supporting comparative negligence mitigate for a treatment of dual culpability as a
factor that further reduces plaintiff's recovery. In effect, states that choose to merge
secondary assumption of risk with contributory negligence treat unreasonable
assumption of risk in this manner. 109
103. See Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 1977).
104. See, e.g., Bulatao v. Kauai Motors, Ltd., 49 Hawaii 1,406 P.2d 887 (1965); Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48,436
P.2d 714 (1968); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959); cf. Ford Motor Co. v.
Arquello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963).
105. See Comment, supra note 16, at 375.
106. See supra text accompanying note 66; W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 68 at 441.
107. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d. 287, 293 (Fla. 1977).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95. But see Arkansas Kraft Corp. v. Johnson, 257 Ark. 629, 519
S.W.2d 74 (1975); Riley v. Davison Constr. Co., 381 Mass. 432, 409 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); Blum v. Brichacek, 191 Neb.
457, 215 N.W.2d 888 (1974); Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977).
109. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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2. Ohio's Decision: Secondary Assumption of
Risk Merged with Contributory Negligence
By ruling in Anderson that assumption of risk and contributory negligence are
merged under Ohio's comparative negligence statute, the Supreme Court of Ohio
abandoned the position that assumption of risk in its secondary sense has a meaning
independent of contributory negligence. The court stated that "conduct previously
considered assumption of risk by the plaintiff shall be considered by the trier of the
fact under the phrase 'contributory negligence of the person bringing the
action'. . . ."1 In Anderson the Ohio court heavily relied upon several cases that
support the position favoring the merger of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence."' For instance, in McConville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co.112 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that assumption of risk, implied
from willingness to proceed in the face of a known hazard, is no longer a defense
separate from contributory negligence.' 13 The McConville case dealt with a guest's
assumption of risk in accepting an automobile ride with a host driver who the guest
knew lacked driving skills and had been drinking." 14 The court held that "if a guest's
exposure of himself to a particular hazard be unreasonable and a failure to exercise
ordinary care for his own safety, such conduct is negligence, and is subject to the
comparative negligence statute." "5 Under this rule, the plaintiff's knowledge of the
circumstances is a factor that the trier of fact considers in determining whether the
plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care, but does not act as a component independent
of or distinguishable from contributory negligence in reducing the plaintiff's
recovery. 116 The court additionally held that reasonable assumption of risk would not
reduce a plaintiff's recovery:
In a particular situation the utility of riding with the host and the inadequacy of any
alternative course may both be so obvious that the guest's acquiescence might constitute
assumption of risk as heretofore existing, but not a lack of ordinary care. In such circum-
stances the guest's acquiescence will constitute no defense under the rule we are now
adopting. We make the policy judgment, however, that much more injustice will be
avoided in the instances where acquiescence [assumption of risk] ceases to raise a com-
plete defense and becomes a matter for comparison by the trier of fact than will be created
in the instances where the acquiescence is not unreasonable and therefore raises no
defense at all under the principles of contributory and comparative negligence.117
Thus, the Wisconsin court decided that conduct that constitutes secondary assump-
tion of risk will affect the apportionment of damages only if the plaintiff unreasonably
110. Anderson v. Ceccardi. 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 113, 451 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1983). Since the court specifically
excluded express and primary assumption of risk from this merger, the quoted passage applies to secondary assumption of
risk only.
I1. See, e.g.. Blackburn v. Dorta. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192
N.W,2d 826 (1971); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co.. 83 Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973); McConville v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
112. 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
113, Id. at 378. 113 N.W.2d at 16.
114. Id. at 376. 113 N.W.2d at 15.
115. Id. at 378, 113 N.W.2d at 16-17.
116. Id. at 379. 113 N.W.2d at 17.
117. Id.
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assumes the risk. Plaintiff's actions will be considered in light of plaintiff's knowl-
edge of the risk, and if these actions constitute reasonable conduct, the plaintiff will
recover fully. If the plaintiff's actions under the circumstances constitute a failure to
exercise ordinary care, recovery will be reduced proportionately." 18
In Lyons v. Redding Construction Co.119 the Supreme Court of Washington
adopted the Wisconsin approach. The Washington court eliminated the doctrine of
secondary assumption of risk by rejecting reasonable assumption of risk as a recovery
reducing concept, and by merging unreasonable assumption of risk with contributory
negligence:
Our limited retention of the doctrine of assumption of risk is, of course, a form of
contributory negligence. Adoption of the standard of comparative negligence is necessar-
ily accompanied by a more flexible weighing of the relative fault attributable to each
party. A concomitant effect of this more delicate apportionment of damages will be the
elimination of the need for the assumption of the risk doctrine. Thus, the calculus of
balancing the relative measurements of fault inevitably incorporates the degree to which
the plaintiff assumed the risk. 120
The Supreme Court of Florida set forth similar reasoning in Blackburn v.
Dorta. 12 ' The Florida court first criticized the view that reasonable assumption of risk
acts as a bar to plaintiffs recovery, stating that no Florida case had reached that result
and that "there is no reason supported by law or justice in this state to give credence
to such a principle of law." 122 The court noted that comparative negligence is the
doctrine that best achieves the goal of tort law-equating liability with fault. "Is
liability equated with fault under a doctrine which would totally bar recovery by one
who voluntarily, but reasonably, assumes a known risk while one whose conduct is
unreasonable but denominated 'contributory negligence' is permitted to recover a
proportionate amount of his damages for injury? Certainly not." 123 The court there-
fore treated unreasonable assumption of risk as simply another form of contributory
negligence. The trier of fact would consider whether the plaintiff's conduct con-
stituted a "failure to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent man under similar
circumstances." ' 124 Thus, the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk is simply another
circumstance to be weighed against the plaintiff in the comparative fault analysis.' 
25
Like Florida, California adopted comparative negligence by judicial decision
rather than by statute and also merged assumption of risk with contributory negli-
gence in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 126 The court in Li stated that "the defense of assump-
118. The Wisconsin court specifically stated that
[ulnder the new rule, the trier of the fact may determine that a guest failed to exercise ordinary care in riding
with a particular host with knowledge of the host's deficiencies in driving, but may also evaluate such failure in
the light of all the circumstances and then compare it with the failures of the host which contribute to the injury.
Id. at 379, 113 N.W.2d 14, 17 (1962).
119. 83 Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973).
120. Id. at 96, 515 P.2d at 826.
121. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977). Florida adopted comparative negligence judicially rather than by statute in
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
122. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 1977).
123. Id. at 293.
124. Id. at 291.
125. Id. at 293.
126. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
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tion of risk is also abolished to the extent that it is merely a variant of the former
doctrine of contributory negligence; [assumption of risk is] to be subsumed under the
general process of assessing liability in proportion to negligence."' '
27
V. CONCLUSION
In Anderson, the Supreme Court of Ohio correctly dealt with the problems
created when a comparative negligence statute mentions contributory negligence but
not the related doctrine of assumption of risk. Under the Anderson approach, the
plaintiff's knowledge of the risk will not by itself act to bar or to reduce plaintiff's
recovery, but will be considered in the inquiry "whether a reasonably prudent man in
the exercise of due care . . . would have incurred the known risk . "128 This
interpretation of Anderson retains at least some semblance of the concept of assump-
tion of risk-the plaintiff's appreciation of the risk-as a mitigating factor in an
unreasonable assumption of risk situation.
The Anderson approach recognizes assumption of risk as culpable conduct yet
remains true to the principles of comparative negligence. Instead of completely
abrogating assumption of risk as a concept, the distinctive elements of the assumption
of risk doctrine-knowledge and free will in accepting a risk-are considered as
factors in determining the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct for purposes of
comparative negligence. Thus, although the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct
is the ultimate issue for determination by the trier of fact, the plaintiff's knowledge of
the risk is considered because it supports a finding of unreasonableness. As a result,
reasonable assumption of risk should not bar or reduce recovery, because objectively
reasonable conduct by the plaintiff cannot be considered contributory negligence and,
therefore, does not meet the requirements of Ohio's comparative negligence statute.
Accordingly, if the plaintiff's actions are deemed to be reasonable despite
knowledge of the circumstances, the plaintiff should recover. However, knowledge
of the circumstances in most cases will limit the plaintiff's choices of reasonable
courses of action. Increased knowledge of a given set of circumstances affords the
plaintiff a greater opportunity to anticipate and avoid a defendant's negligent actions.
As a result, what may constitute reasonable conduct by an unknowing plaintiff may
be considered unreasonable if the plaintiff had knowledge of the circumstances.
For example, assume a large dead branch from defendant's tree overhangs an
often used pathway. If a reasonable person using ordinary care would not ascertain
that the branch was about to break, an unknowing plaintiff's use of the path would not
constitute contributory negligence. However, the use of the path by a plaintiff with
knowledge of the weak branch must be judged in light of that knowledge. If a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have continued to use the path
despite this knowledge, the plaintiff should recover fully. On the other hand, if a
reasonable person would have acted differently based upon the knowledge, the plain-
127. Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875; see also Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 113,451
N.E.2d 780, 783 (1983).
128. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions. Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 54, 155 A.2d 90, 95-96 (1959).
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tiffs recovery should be diminished in proportion to the extent the plaintiffs actions
deviated from those of a reasonable person.
Ohio's merger of unreasonable secondary assumption of risk into contributory
negligence probably will have little effect beyond eliminating unreasonable secon-
dary assumption of risk as a per se bar to recovery. Since Ohio has adopted a
modified form of comparative negligence,12 9 which denies recovery if the plaintiff's
comparative fault exceeds fifty percent, negligent conduct that previously would have
amounted to assumption of risk probably now will constitute contributory negligence
greater than fifty percent. For example, an unknowing plaintiffs conduct may
amount to forty percent negligence. The plaintiff in this situation is entitled to a sixty
percent recovery. However, if the same plaintiff had prior knowledge of the danger,
similar conduct might be considered to constitute over fifty percent negligence since
the relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances would
have incurred the known risk. Thus, although the Anderson decision will eliminate
secondary unreasonable assumption of risk as an automatic bar to recovery, 130 in
many cases an unreasonable and knowing plaintiff may nevertheless be barred com-
pletely.
Merging secondary assumption of risk with contributory negligence will not
eliminate the concept of assumption of risk, and probably will not eliminate the use of
assumption of risk as a term descriptive of plaintffs' conduct. 131 A plaintiffs volun-
tary acceptance of a known risk should be considered in determining responsibility
for a resulting harm. Thus, the concept of assumption of risk will not disappear.
Instead, its application under comparative fault principles will remove the sting of the
all-or-nothing common law doctrine, and will focus attention upon key elements-
knowledge and freedom of choice-that comprise the doctrine of assumption of risk.
Matthew J. Toddy
129. See supra notes 1-2.
130. See Danner v. Medical Center Hosp., 8 Ohio St. 3d 19, 19-20, 456 N.E.2d 503, 504 (1983); Hirschbach v.
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 206, 209, 452 N.E.2d 326, 329-30 (1983).
131. As noted by Prosser, assumption of risk "is a distinctive kind of contributory negligence, in which the plaintiff
knows the risk and voluntarily accepts it .... W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 68 at 456. Further, the term assumption of
risk serves to focus attention upon the plaintiff's action-the voluntary acceptance of a known risk. Id. at 457.
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